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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF U FAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Case No. 20030380-CA
RAYMOND DEAN McARTHUR,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDIC I ION ^ ND NATUR1 OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction

.» •

•• *

....*.,.

IU

, ^ o r using a

dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, ; class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 7610-506 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederic^ - w>

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-

3(2)(e) (2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether defendant's i l.uiu (ails because he asserts no plain error in the district
court's denial of his motion to withdraw, which is the only order from which he has a right
to appeal.
This question does i lot i equii e tl lis Court to review any ruling or failure to rule by the
district court; accordingly, no standard of review applies.

2, Whether omitting speedy and impartial from the plea colloquy constituted obvious
and prejudicial error, where they are included in the Statement of Defendant, which
defendant read, discussed with counsel, and understood.
Defendant proceeds under the "onerous plain error standard." State v. Labmm, 881
P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (1996). To
establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate: (i) an error occurred; (ii) the error was
obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
3. Whether defendant's and his counsel's certification that he "twice exhibited a knife
in a threatening manner in the presence of two persons" is a sufficient factual basis to support
the guilty plea.
Defendant again proceeds under the "onerous plain error standard," which requires him
to show obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is relevant to this appeal.
Rule 11. Pleas.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived therightto counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
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(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
nght against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the nght to confront and cross-examine in open court the
prosecution witnesses, the nght to compel the attendance of defense witnesses,
and that by entering the plea, these nghts are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements ot the ottense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is
an admission of all those elements,
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged cnme was actually committed by the defendant or, if
the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be
imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of
the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result ot a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the nght of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Raymond Dean McArthur—also known as Raymond McKenna, Randall Peterson, and
Trent Peterson—was charged by Domestic Violence Information dated 29 October 2002 w ith
two third degree felonies and four misdemeanors:
Count I

Aggravated assault (domestic violence), a third degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999) and 77-36-1 (1999);

Count II

Aggravated assault (domestic violence), a third degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999) and 77-36-1 (1999);

Count III

Assault, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5102 (Supp. 2002);

Count IV

Interference with a peace officer making an arrest, a class B
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999);

Count V

Commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child, a class
B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(c)(i)
(Supp. 2002);

Count VI

Intoxication, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-9-701(1) (1999).

R. 3-6. A warrant was issued for his arrest. R. 1. Defendant was bound over on all counts
except count IV. R. 91: 45.
Defendant pled guilty to two reduced counts of threatening with or using a dangerous
weapon in a fight or quarrel, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506
(1999), and the remaining counts were dismissed. R. 45-46. The court reduced defendant's
bail, ordered defendant to have no contact with the victims, and ordered a presentence
investigation report. R. 45-47.
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On 21 February 2003, defendant was sentenced to one year in jail on each count, to run
consecutively. R. 50-51. He was also ordered "not to contact victim(s) in any way." R. 51.
Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he had "been informed
by third parties that his mother, if called to testify in court in this matter, would provide
testimony which was favorable to him and which would not support the state's theory that
he committed two counts of Aggravated Assault." R. 54.
Defendant did not testify at the motion hearing. See R. 87. The court denied the
motion, noting that "the mother's statement in the pre-sentence report was to the effect that
she was afraid of this man, that she couldn't deal with him anymore, and she feared him to
the point that she was afraid to even make a statement in the pre-sentence report." R. 67-69;
R. 87: 4-5. Defendant timely appealed. R. 70.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Defendant terrorizes his mother, sister, daughter, and granddaughter
In October of 2002, defendant was babysitting for his daughter, Sherile Fernandez. R.
91: 5-6. At about 11:30 p.m., Sherile took defendant back to his home. R. 91: 6-7, 11.
Sherile's five-year-old daughter Monica was in the back seat, on the driver's side. R. 91: 7.
Sherile smelled alcohol on defendant and asked him how much he had drunk; he pulled
out a 40-ounce bottle of "Wyoming beer" and said, "Two of these." R. 91: 12.
They drove to defendant's mother's home and parked in the driveway. R. 91: 8.
Sherile and defendant began to argue. R.91:7,13-14. He wanted to take Monica overnight,
1

This fact statement is based on facts presented in the preliminary hearing. Judge
William W. Barrett presided at the preliminary hearing. R. 92: 91.
5

but Sherile noticed he had been drinking and did not want to leave her daughter with him.
R. 91: 7. When Sherile told defendant he couldn't take Monica, he "got very belligerent and
rude," calling her names and saying "bad things" about her. R. 91: 8. Sherile told him to get
out of the car, but he refused. R. 91: 8.
Sherile moved away from defendant "because he was drunk and [she] didn't know what
he was capable of doing." R. 91: 14. Defendant also hit Sherile three times in the head with
a closed fist, while Sherile tried to "block the punches." R. 91: 8, 15. Her head hurt for two
weeks. R. 91: 8. Defendant then got out of the car and went around to Monica's door. R.
91:9. Sherilejumped out and told him to get away from her daughter. R. 91:9. She did not
want him to open the door. R. 91: 9. Defendant grabbed her and threw her to the ground.
R. 91: 9,16. Because defendant had a 40-ounce glass bottle in his hand, and Sherile thought
he might throw it at her, she "curled up in a ball." R. 91: 9, 17.
By that time, defendant's mother, Afton McArthur, and his sister, Laura Kendall, came
out of the house. R. 91: 9-10. They were screaming. R. 91: 10. Sherile ran into the house,
got their cordless phone, walked out to the porch, and called 911. R. 91: 10, 18. As the
phone was ringing, defendant came up and "slugged" her "full force" in the head. R. 91: 10,
21-22. Then he ran. R. 91:10.
After speaking with police, Afton and Laura went back inside the house, locked the
doors, "locked the door between the basement and the kitchen, and just sat there with the
lights on wondering what should we do." R. 91: 22-23. They were sure defendant would
return. R. 91: 23.
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He did. He was rattling the back door and saying, "Mom, I've got to get in and get my
stuff. Mom, Mom, let me in." R. 91:23. He then started going to different doors trying to
get in. R. 91 * 29. Afton and Laura "sat there just frozen, didn't know what to do " R 91
23 Laura called the police. R. 91: 26.
They heard a basement screen window being kicked in, and the door from the basement
to the upstairs "break" open. R. 91: 23, 29 Carrying a container that Laura thought was an
aspinn bottle, defendant went to the kitchen and picked up a 10-inch butcher knife and
struggled with the bottle. R. 91: 24. In the living room, Laura was sitting in a chair and
Afton was standing near the door. R. 91 • 24. Defendant came into the living room, walked
to the door, and said, "Now, we're going to turn off the lights and pretend like we're not
home, and Mom, you're going to go he down." R. 91: 24. As he said this, he had the knife
raised, pointing away from him. R. 91: 24-25.
Defendant then locked the door, turned off the porch light and television, and sat down
near Laura, stood up, and sat down, "not saying, you know, T'm going to kill'—well, not
saying much of anything, really, just kind of motioning around." R. 91. 25. He still had the
knife R 91*25-26.
At that point Laura stood up, pulled her mother by the sleeve, and tried to open the door
Just as she opened the door, a police officer arrived. R. 91: 26. After the two women ran
out, Officer Evans walked into the residence and saw defendant with a knife in his hand. R
91 35. Evans drew his weapon and pointed it at defendant, who immediately sat down,
dropped the knife, and "advised [Evans] to shoot him." R. 91: 35. Evans "didn't think that
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was a wise idea," so he holstered his weapon and, observing that defendant was unwilling
to comply with his orders, "sprayed him with pepper spray, which he reacted well to." R.
91:35-37.
While defendant was screaming, Officer Evans wrestled him to the ground and, after
a struggle, handcuffed him. R. 91: 36.
Defendant pleads guilty1
At the change of plea hearing, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT:... Now insofar as the proposed resolution is concerned, Ms.
Remal, have you discussed it with Mr. McArthur?
MS. REMAL: I have.
THE COURT: And you've gone over the statement of the defendant with
him?
MS. REMAL: I have.
THE COURT: Are you persuaded he understands the effect and meaning
of what he's about to do here?
MS. REMAL: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. McArthur, do you understand what's being proposed
here?
MR. MCARTHUR: I'm quite sure (inaudible).
THE COURT: Well, you've talked to your lawyer about it, haven't you?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes.
2

The transcript of the entire change of plea hearing is attached as addendum A. Judge
J. Dennis Frederick presided at the change of plea hearing.
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THE COURT: You've gone over that statement with your lawyer, haven't
you?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand that statement?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions at ail about it?
MR. MCARTHUR: No, sir.

THE COURT: You understand, Mr. McArthur, by pleading guilty you're
waiving certain constitutional rights that you otherwise have.
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Including the right to b[e] tried by a jury of eight people, the
right to require the State to prove their case against you beyond a reasonable doubt
to the unanimous satisfaction of a jury of eight people, the right to confront and
cross examine witnesses produced by the State against you, therightto compel the
attendance of witnesses in your own behalf at no cost to you, the right to take the
stand and testify in your own behalf, if you choose, or remain silent during the
trial, if you choose, and the right to appeal in the event a jury finds you guilty of
the charges at a trial, as well as the right to be presumed innocent until you're
found guilty if you are, all of which rights, as well as the others contained on
that statement that we may not have discussed you're waiving by the entry
of a guilty plea. Do you understand that?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir, I do.
THE COURT: And knowing those waivers, do you want to proceed with this
plea arrangement that the lawyers now have decided upon?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you're doing this freely and voluntarily?
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MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir
THE COURT: Are you prepared to sign that statement at this time?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT. You may do so.
(Defendant signs statement.)
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, if I may approach, Mr Mc Arthur has now signed
the statement (inaudible) as well.
THE COURT Very well, thank you. Indeed both Counsel and defendant
have signed the statement. Mr. McArthur, you understand by having signed this
statement you are admitted is [sic] true and correct the following facts and
elements involved in two separate counts of threatening with or using a
dangerous weapon in a fight or a quarrel, specifically that on or about the 26th of
October of last year through the 27th of October of last year, at the location of 309
North, 1000 West in Salt Lake City, you, according to the offense, did not in self
defense draw or exhibit a dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening manner or
unlawfully used the same in a fight or quarrel. Those facts and elements are true
and correct, are they not, sir?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT' This same conduct, which is constituted as a threat of a
dangerous—use of a dangerous weapon in a fight occurred at the same location,
309 North, 1000 West during the same time frame, the 26th/27th October on two
different occasions.
MS. REMAL: It was during one incident, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, there's two different charges.
MS. REMAL: Right.
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes.
THE COURT: So someone has been able to find that there were two
separate incidences going on here, even though it may have been part of the same
larger fight, nght? You're prepared to plead to two separate charges—
10

MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, there—
THE COURT: —involving the use of threatening use of a dangerous
weapon.
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand that those facts and elements constitute
two separate class A misdemeanor crimes for which you could be sentenced by
this Court for a period of up to one year in the Adult Detention Center and fined
a sum of $2500 plus a surcharge. That's clear to you; is it not?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And knowing the potential penalty of one year and/or a $2500
fine on each of the two, do you want to proceed with this arrangement these
lawyers have worked out?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand further that if I determine to commit you to
the jail, those terms in jail could well be consecutive as opposed to concurrent?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
R. 92: 3-9 (emphasis added).
In the plea colloquy, defendant signed a Statement of Defendant In Support of Guilty
Plea and Certificate of Counsel. R. 35-41 (addendum B). In the Statement, defendant
declares that he twice exhibited a knife in a threatening manner in the presence of two
persons:
These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas
and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no
contest): [handwritten:] On October 26,2002, at 309 North 1000 West, Salt Lake
County, I twice exhibited a knife in a threatening manner in the presence of two
persons.
11

R. 36 (emphasis added). The Statement also avers: "I know that I have a right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by
pleading guilty (or no contest)." R. 37 (emphasis added).
In addition, defense counsel signed a Certificate of Defense Attorney certifying that
defendant had read and understood the Statement and that the factual basis of the crime was
correct:
I certify that I am the attorney for Raymond D. McArthur, the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to
him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate
investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit,
are accurate and true.
R. 40 (emphasis added). The court also signed the Statement. It found that the plea was
"freely, knowingly, and voluntarily" made "[b]ased on the facts set forth in the foregoing
Statement and the certification of the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral
representations in court. . ." R. 42.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. A defendant appealing from the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea cannot
appeal plain errors allegedly committed in the plea hearing, only those committed in the
motion hearing. For an appellate court to directly review the plea hearing would violate the
prohibition against direct review of guilty pleas. Cases to the contrary are wrongly decided,
and the issue is pending before the Utah Supreme Court.
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2. Omitting speedy and impartial from the plea colloquy did not constitute obvious and
prejudicial error where they are included in the statement of defendant, which he read,
discussed, and understood. Defendant's claim that the trial court did not intend to rely on the
plea affidavit to satisfy rule 11 requirements defies record evidence.
In addition, his choice not to advance an ineffective assistance claim against his trial
counsel demonstrates that any possible rule 11 errors were not obvious. Finally, defendant
has failed to demonstrate, or even assert, that he pled guilty only because he believed his trial
would be delayed and his jury biased. He therefore fails to satisfy the prejudice prong of the
plain error test. Cases holding that prejudice is presumed are wrongly decided, and the issue
is pending before the Utah Supreme Court.
3. Defendant's and his counsel's certification that he "twice exhibited a knife in a
threatening manner in the presence of two persons" is a sufficient factual basis to support
defendant's guilty plea. In the plea affidavit, defendant certified that he committed two
counts of threatening with a dangerous weapon. In the plea colloquy, the trial judge
laboriously reiterated that defendant was pleading guilty to two separate crimes, that he
would be sentenced separately for the crimes, and that his sentences could be run
consecutively.

The fact that evidence presented at the preliminary hearing may be

ambiguous on this point is irrelevant: the factual basis for a guilty plea is not circumscribed
by evidence presented in the preliminary hearing, especially in light of the assumption that
the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the investigation continues.
Finally, no error that requires 21 pages of briefing to explain can be obvious.
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ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE HE ASSERTS NO PLAIN
ERROR IN THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO
WITHDRAW, WHICH IS THE ONLY ORDER FROM WHICH HE HAS
A RIGHT TO APPEAL
Defendant's claim should be dismissed because he asserts error in a hearing from which
he has no right of appeal. When a defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, the appellate court has jurisdiction to correct plain errors committed
in the motion hearing, but not plain errors committed in the plea hearing, from which
defendant has no right of appeal.
Utah law does not permit a defendant to directly attack a guilty plea on appeal. For over
a decade, Utah procedure has required a defendant to file a motion to withdraw as a predicate
to direct appellate review of the validity of a guilty plea. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f
3, 40 P.3d 630; State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1311-12 (Utah 1987); Summers v. Cook,
759 P.2d 341, 343-45 (Utah App. 1988). This is so because the appellate court lacks
jurisdiction to directly review the plea hearing, even for plain errors. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, Iff
4, 5. Defendant must first file a timely motion to withdraw his plea. Id. at f 4. He may then
appeal the order denying that motion.
This arrangement is similar to the appeal of a bindover. An appellate court may not
entertain an appeal from a magistrate's bindover order. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464,
467 (Utah 1991). He must first move to quash the bindover in the district court (which may
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in fact be presided over by the same "magistrate" who bound him over), then appeal from the
denial of his motion to quash. Id at 468 n.9
Reyes sought to circumvent these requirements. After pleading guilty, he filed a rule
22(e) motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, the district court denied his motion and
Reyes appealed. Id at f 1. On appeal, the supreme court noted, Reyes "has not addressed
the court's denial of his motion.. " Id at f 2. Rather, he claimed plain error in the taking
of his plea. Id atfflf2, 3 In effect, he attempted to use his rule 22(e) motion as a Trojan
horse to admit him to the appellate forum, where he sought direct plain error review of his
plea heanng. His attempt failed, however, as the supreme court dismissed his appeal for lack
of jurisdiction. Id atf 5.
Defendant's approach here is not materially different. Although he filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, on appeal he "has not addressed the court's denial of his motion
.." Id at f 2. He points to no plain error in the denial of his motion to withdraw, which is
the only order from which he has a right of appeal, but seeks direct plain error review of the
plea heanng. For this Court to directly review the plea heanng, even for plain error, would
be to grant defendant precisely what Reyes and the cases upon which it relies forbid* direct
review of the plea hearing. Plain error review is available in plea withdrawal cases, but it is
limited to review of plain errors committed in connection with a distnct court's denial of the
motion to withdraw.
Accordingly, this Court should dismiss for lack of junsdiction.3
3

The State recognizes that this Court has engaged in plain error review of plea
heanngs, but the practice is currently being challenged on certioran review See, e g, State
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II.
OMITTING SPEEDY AND IMPARTIAL FROM THE PLEA
COLLOQUY DID NOT CONSTITUTE OBVIOUS AND PREJUDICIAL
ERROR WHERE THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE STATEMENT OF
DEFENDANT, WHICH HE READ, DISCUSSED, AND UNDERSTOOD
Defendant's claims fail on the merits in any event. Defendant claims that "the trial
court committed plain and obvious error when it failed to ascertain during the plea colloquy
whether McArthur intended to waive his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury." Br.
Aplt. at 15. This is so, he argues, because his reading of the record "supports that the trial
court opted not to use the written statement/affidavit as a basis for fulfilling the requirements
set forth at Rule 11(e)." Br. Aplt. at 11.
Defendant is forced into this reading of the record by the fact that the Statement of
Defendant, signed by both defendant and his counsel, states, "I know that I have a right to
a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right
by pleading guilty (or no contest)." R. 37. Consequently, this claim fails if the Statement
was properly incorporated into the plea colloquy. It was.
A.

The trial court properly incorporated the plea affidavit.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(3) states that a court may not accept a guilty
plea until the court has found that
the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses,
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived.

v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 57 P.3d 1106, cert granted 64 P.3d 586 (Utah 2003).
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The trial court bears the burden of ensuring compliance with this rule. State v. Visser,
2000 UT 88, K 11,22 P.3d 1242 (citing State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312, 1313 (Utah
1987). This means "that the trial court [must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty
plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly
waived his or her constitutional rights." State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993).
The supreme court has "described the court's duty in this regard as a duty of 'strict'
compliance." Visser, 2000 UT 88 at ^f 11. "Strict compliance, however, does not mandate
a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed." Id. (citing Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 996;
State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991)).
The objective of rule 11—ensuring that defendants know of their rights and thus
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty—should not be
"overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual." Id.
Compliance with rule 11 "may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the
defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement." Utah
R.Crim.P. 11(e)(8). The rule mentions only two methods of compliance: direct questioning
or an affidavit. However, "the rule is stated permissively and thus does not prevent a court
from taking into account other record factors in making its findings." Visser, 2000 UT 88
f 12. "Strict compliance does not require a specific method of communicating the rights
enumerated by rule 11." Id. at ^f 13. Indeed, "'strict compliance can be accomplished by
multiple means,' including 'the contents of other documents such as the information,
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presentence reports, exhibits, etc.,' as long as cno requirement of the rule is omitted and so
long as the record reflects that the requirement has been fulfilled/" Maguire, 830 P.2d at
218; but see State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212 K 12, 73 P.3d 985 (stating that because neither
the plea colloquy nor the affidavit referred to the preliminary hearing "we must limit
ourselves to the plea colloquy, the affidavit, and the information").

Thus, the strict

compliance test does not require "a time-consuming, mechanical oral recitation of each
element mentioned in the rule." Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218.
Here, the record of the plea colloquy amply establishes that defendant "read,
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement." Utah R.Crim.P. 11(e)(8).
First, defense counsel assured the judge, in response to his questions, that she had "gone over
the statement of defendant with him" and was "persuaded he understands the effect and
meaning of what he's about to do here." R. 92: 3-4. The judge then asked defendant whether
he had "gone over that statement with [his] lawyer," and whether he understood it; defendant
declared that he had. R. 92: 5-6. He had no questions about it. R. 92: 6. The judge then
enumerated many of the rights defendant would be waiving by pleading guilty, adding "all
of which rights, as well as the others contained on that statement that we may not have
discussed you're waiving by the entry of a guilty plea. Do you understand that?" R. 92: 7.
Defendant answered, "Yes, sir, I do." R. 92: 7.
The judge then asked defendant if he was "prepared to sign that statement at this time?"
Id. Defendant was. "You may do so," the judge stated. Id. Defense counsel noted that
defendant had signed the statement, to which the judge responded "Indeed, both Counsel and
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defendant have signed the statement." Id. The judge then continued, "Mr. McArthur, you
understand by having signed this statement you are admitting is true and correct the
following facts and elements . . .?" Id. Defendant: "Yes, sir." R. 92: 8. After further
discussion of the facts and elements of the case, the judge stated, "I will therefore accept your
statement if it is executed freely and voluntarily, Mr. McArthur, which I assume it is?" R.
92: 9. Defendant: "Yes, sir (inaudible)." Id.
The judge thus discussed the affidavit at length with defendant and did not merely
"assume that defense attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand the contents of
the affidavit/' Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313.
Despite the foregoing exhaustive discussion of the plea affidavit, defendant surmises
that "the trial court opted not to use the written statement/affidavit as a basis for fulfilling the
requirements set forth at Rule 11(e)." Br. Aplt. at 11. Defendant argues that the judge
should have ascertained "what was set forth in the statement, what defendant reviewed with
his attorney, and the extent to which defendant comprehended and acknowledged those
provisions of the statement that he reviewed." Br. Aplt. at 12. "While such a procedure
would have taken additional time, that is inconsequential." Id. Indeed, defendant would
have the trial court "examine McArthur about constitutional rights identified in the statement
. . . " Br. Aplt. at 18.
On the contrary, such a meticulous exegesis of the affidavit is not required by law.
Nothing in the rule or controlling precedent requires a trial court to orally canvas the entire
affidavit with the defendant. Indeed, the purpose of the plea affidavit is to obviate such a
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"time-consuming, mechanical oral recitation of each element mentioned in the rule."
Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218. The rule defendant advocates would render plea affidavits
useless.
The trial court here engaged in thorough discussion of the statement, ascertaining on
the record that defendant "read, understood, and acknowledged" its contents. Utah R.Crim.P.
11(e)(8). Nothing more is required. Because the Statement informed defendant that he was
waiving a "speedy" trial before an "impartial" jury, and the Statement was fully incorporated
into the plea colloquy, defendant's claim fails.4
B.

Any error was not obvious.

The trial court committed no error. But even assuming arguendo that it did, the error
was not obvious. Defendant proceeds under the "onerous plain error standard." State v.
Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994). To establish plain error, an appellant must
demonstrate: (i) an error occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).

4

Defendant claims that "[t]he record of the plea proceedings does not indicate
whether McArthur read the statement before signing it." Br. Aplt. at 9, n.2. On the contrary,
defense counsel certified in writing "that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have
read it to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands
the meaning of its contents . . . " R. 40.
In addition, at the time he pled guilty, defendant was 43 years old, read and
understood English, and had completed two years of college. R. 39. He orally assured the
court that he had gone over the Statement with counsel, understood it, and had no questions
about it. R. 92: 5-6. Moreover, he asserts in the Statement itself that "I have read this
statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its contents and adopt
each statement in it as my own." R. 39.
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This Court has long recognized that "if the error was plain to the court, it should also
have been plain to trial counsel, who should have raised an appropriate objection. For this
reason, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel typically is raised in conjunction with
alleging plain error." Labrum 881 P.2d at 906. Indeed, "in any case where appellate counsel
finds himself or herself needing to use the plain error doctrine to get an issue before the
appellate court, a red flag should go up warning of the likelihood of a concomitant ineffective
assistance of counsel claim . . ." Id. at 907.
Here, defendant's trial counsel participated in the plea hearing, and filed and argued a
motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea, all without raising this supposedly obvious
claim. Yet defendant asserts no claim of ineffective assistance. That a defense attorney,
whom defendant tacitly concedes was effective, participated in the plea hearing and moved
to withdraw the plea without noticing the alleged error defendant now urges on appeal
demonstrates that any error cannot have been obvious.
C.

Any error was not prejudicial.

Similarly, even assuming arguendo that the trial court failed to ensure that defendant
was aware of his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury, any error was not prejudicial.
Defendant asserts that no prejudice showing is required once a rule 11(e) violation is
proven. For this proposition he relies on State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 57 P.3d 1106,
cert, granted, 64 P.3d 586 (Utah 2003); State v. Kittle, 2002 UT App 134,47 P.3d 101, cert,
granted, 59 P.3d 603 (2003); State v. Cornell, 2003 UT App 261, 74 P.3d 1171, petition for
cert, filed (IS August 2003); and cases cited therein. These cases do assert that our courts
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will presume harm under plain error analysis when a trial court fails to inform a defendant

of his constitutional rights under rule 11." Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, f 9.
However, the law is in reality not so clear. In State v. Kay, a prs-Gibbons case, the Utah
Supreme Court stated, "If we were to hold that any violation of Rule 11 automatically voids
the resultant plea, even when the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would
encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced after such a plea, to attack their convictions
for purely tactical reasons, either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas corpus long after the
fact." State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., with one justice
concurring, one justice concurring in part (including the quoted language) and concurring in
the judgment, and two justices concurring in the judgment). "Almost certainly, the ultimate
result [of overturning convictions without a showing of prejudice] would be to free a number
of convicted persons for nothing more than technical errors in the acceptance of their
voluntary guilty pleas." Id. at 1302.
This is especially true in the plain error context. To establish plain error, an appellant
must demonstrate that an error was harmful. Dunn, 850P.2dat 1208. While noncompliance
with rule 11 may establish error and, in some cases, even obvious error, it does not
necessarily establish prejudice.

Indeed, this Court recognized a prejudice requirement in

State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, H 15, 5 P.3d 1222, where it failed "to see how the
court's failure in this case to discuss the possibility that defendant may serve no time and
incur no fine [as required by rule 11(e)(5)] would result in a harmful error."
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Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel share a "common standard" of
prejudice. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, t 31 n.14, 12 P.3d 92 (citations omitted). A
defendant claiming that his guilty plea resulted from counsel's ineffectiveness must show "wa
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah)
(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,59(1985)), cert denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). Thus,
a defendant attempting to show plain error under rule 11 must demonstrate that but for the
trial court's omissions, he would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to
trial.
In other words, where a defendant claims plain error in the taking of his plea, the test
for prejudice is driven not by the requirements of rule 11, but by traditional plain error
analysis.D
A similar rule is followed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Rule 1 l's federal counterpart includes a subsection entitled "Harmless Error." Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(h). That subsection provides, "Any variance from the procedures required by this rule
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." This provision "rejects the
extreme sanction of automatic reversal." Advisory Committee Note (1983 amendment).
"The court of appeals strayed from this analysis in Tarnawiecfci by presuming
prejudice, i.e., that failure to advise Tarnawiecki of her right to a speedy trial before an
impartial jury "is prejudicial and therefore harmful." Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,1f 18.
Tarnawiecki should have been required to demonstrate that, but for the trial court's violations
of rule 11, she would not have pled guilty. Otherwise, omission of the words "speedy" and
"impartial," like the failure to advise Tarnawiecki of her minimum possible sentence as
required by rule 11(e)(5), would have been harmless.
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Thus, a rule 11 violation "warrants reversal only if it had a significant influence on
appellant's decision to plead guilty." United States v. Vaughn, 7F.3d 1533, 1535 (10th Cir.
1993) (citing United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702, 704 (10th Cir. 1990)), cert, denied, 511
U.S. 1036 (1994). Otherwise stated, the reviewing court will "'examine the facts and
circumstances of the .. . case to see if the district court's flawed compliance with . .. Rule
1 1 . . . may reasonably be viewed as having been a material factor affecting [defendant]'s
decision to plead guilty.'" United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 1998)
(quoting United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), in turn quoting
United States v. Bachynsky, 934 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
Although our rule 11 contains no harmless error provision, our plain error analysis does.
See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. The Tenth Circuit's formulation is thus a useful guide to the
application of harmless error analysis in the rule 11 context. To show that a rule 11 violation
was harmful, a defendant must demonstrate that the errors significantly influenced or
materially affected his decision to plead guilty.

Otherwise stated, defendant must

demonstrate prejudice by showing that his decision to plead guilty rested upon some
misunderstanding that a proper rule 11 colloquy would have dispelled.
Here, the court held a hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Defendant did not then, nor has he since, asserted—much less proven—that he pled guilty
in the belief that his trial would have been delayed and his jury biased. On the contrary,
defendant seeks reversal "for nothing more than technical errors in the acceptance of [his]
voluntary guilty plea[]." Kay, 111 P.2d at 1302.
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III.
DEFENDANT'S AND HIS COUNSELS CERTIFICATION THAT HE
"TWICE EXHIBITED A KNIFE IN A THREATENING MANNER IN
THE PRESENCE OF TWO PERSONS" IS A SUFFICIENT FACTU\L
BASIS TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA
Defendant claims that "the trial court committed plain error when it failed to explain the
legal elements in relation to the facts for the guilty pleas" and "when it failed to ascertain a
factual basis for each guilty plea." Br. Aplt. at 19 (capitalization and underlining omitted)
This claim fails because it ignores the plea affidavit.
A.

Defendant understood the nature and elements of the offenses to which
he pled guilty.

Defendant first argues that "the trial court did not discuss the elements of both offenses
in relation to the facts of the case" but "relied on one set of facts to support a guilty plea for
both counts." Br. Aplt. at 19 (capitalization and underlining omitted).
Rule 11(e)(4)(A) provides that the trial court may not accept a guilty plea until it has
found that "the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered." "Failure to inform a defendant of the nature and elements of the offense is
fatal to a guilty plea conviction." State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah App.), cert
denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (1990).
Where the plea colloquy incorporates the plea affidavit, which in turn incorporates the
information, the court may, in assessing the defendant's understanding, rely on the plea
colloquy, the affidavit, and the information. State v Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, f 12, 73 P 3d
985, cert denied, 78 P.3d 987 (2003).
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Defendant pled guilty to two counts of threatening with or using a dangerous weapon
in a fight or quarrel, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1999):
Every person... who, not in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more
persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening
manner or unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
Defendant's brief speculates that he "entered two guilty pleas for a single incident
through some misapprehension of the facts and the elements." Br. Aplt. at 31. This
speculation of counsel lacks record support. Defendant himself has never claimed to have
misunderstood anything. On the contrary, the record amply demonstrates that he understood
the nature and elements of the crimes to which he pled guilty. In his plea affidavit, defendant
recognizes the elements of the crime:
Every person who, not in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more
persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening
manner or unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel.
R. 36. He also admits the facts of his crimes—that he "twice" exhibited a knife in a
threatening manner in the presence of two persons:
These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas
and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no
contest): [handwritten:] On October 26,2002, at 309 North 1000 West, Salt Lake
County, I twice exhibited a knife in a threatening manner in the presence of two
persons.
R. 36. Moreover, defense counsel certified that these statements were accurate and true:
To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and
true.
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R.40.
Defendant now complains that he "did not have the opportunity to understand the nature
of the elements in relation to this case, or to explain to the judge how his conduct constituted
only one crime." Br. Aplt. at 29. On the contrary, the judge ensured that defendant was
under no illusions as to the fact that he was pleading guilty to two separate counts:
THE COURT: Very well, thank you. Indeed both Counsel and defendant
have signed the statement. Mr. McArthur, you understand by having signed this
statement you are admitted is [sic] true and correct the following facts and
elements involved in two separate counts of threatening with or using a
dangerous weapon in a fight or a quarrel, specifically that on or about the 26th of
October of last year through the 27th of October of last year, at the location of 309
North, 1000 West in Salt Lake City, you, according to the offense, did not in self
defense draw or exhibit a dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening manner or
unlawfully used the same in a fight or quarrel. Those facts and elements are true
and correct, are they not, sir?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: This same conduct, which is constituted as a threat of a
dangerous—use of a dangerous weapon in a fight occurred at the same location,
309 North, 1000 West during the same time frame, the 26th/27th October on two
different occasions.
MS. REMAL: It was during one incident, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, there's two different charges.
MS. REMAL: Right.
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes.
THE COURT: So someone has been able to find that there were two
separate incidences going on here, even though it may have been part of the same
larger fight, right? You're prepared to plead to two separate charges—
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, there—
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THE COURT: —involving the use of threatening use of a dangerous
weapon.
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand that those facts and elements constitute
two separate class A misdemeanor crimes for which you could be sentenced by
this Court for a period of up to one year in the Adult Detention Center and fined
a sum of $2500 plus a surcharge. That's clear to you; is it not?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And knowing the potential penalty of one year and/or a $2500
fine on each of the two, do you want to proceed with this arrangement these
lawyers have worked out?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand furthermore that if I determine to commit you
to the jail, those terms in jail could well be consecutive as opposed to concurrent?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
R. 92: 7-9 (emphasis added). The court went to extraordinary lengths to ensure, on the
record, that defendant understood that he was pleading guilty to two separate crimes.
B.

There was a factual basis for the plea.

Rule 11(e)(4)(B) provides that "the court may not accept the plea until the court has
found" that "there is a factual basis for the plea." A factual basis is sufficient "if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction — " Id. The plain language
of the rule requires a showing that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a
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substantial risk of conviction only if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit
culpability, as in State v Stilling, $56? 2d 666 (Utah App 1993) Unlike Stilling, defendant
here admitted culpability R 92 8, 10-12 (addendum A) Hence, no showing of substantial
risk of con\ iction was required.
The relev ant question then is whether the record "establishes that the charged crime w as
actually committed by the defendant." Again, the plea affidavit satisfies this requirement
These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas
and prove the elements of the cnme(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no
contest) [handwritten ] On October 26, 2002, at 309 North 1000 West, Salt Lake
County, I twice exhibited a knife in a threatening manner in the presence of two
persons
R 36. Nothing more is required. Where an informed defendant, defense counsel, and the
prosecutor all agree that defendant committed the charged crime twice, whether the
preliminary heanng evidence is clear on this point is irrelevant The court may look to the
preliminary heanng for a factual basis. See Willett v Barnes, 842 P 2d 860, 862-63 (Ltah
1992)

However, the factual basis for a guilty plea is not circumscnbed by evidence

presented in the preliminary heanng, especially in light of "the assumption

that the

prosecution's case will only get stronger as the investigation continues " State v Clark, 2001
UT 9, K 10, 20 P 3d 300 (quoting Evans v State, 963 P 2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998), in turn
citing State v Pledger, 896 P 2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995)).
This case is unlike State v Thurman, 911 P 2d 371 (Utah 1996). There, the trial court
was confused about the mental state required to commit the cnme of aggravated murder by
bomb—indeed, one issue on appeal was what the proper mental state was After holding that
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the correct mental state was "intentional or knowing," id. at 373, the supreme court examined
the record for evidence that Thurman had admitted to this mental state. It first reviewed the
plea affidavit. Although it referred to defendant's having acted "intentionally or knowingly/'
in the next sentence Thurman stated, "It was not my intention to kill [the victim]." Id. at 374.
Rather, he acknowledged having "created a grave risk of death..." Id. Not only did the oral
colloquy fail to clarify this discrepancy, it suggested that the trial court itself was unclear on
the requisite mental state. The supreme court concluded, "If the intentional or knowing
element of the offense was not clear to the trial court, we can hardly assume that it was clear
to Thurman at the time he entered his plea." Id. at 375.
Here, neither the court nor the defendant exhibited any confusion over the elements of
the offense, nor did defendant deny any element. Thurman is inapposite.
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983) is similarly distinguishable.
Breckenridge pled guilty to arson, an intentional crime. Id. at 443. Yet in the plea colloquy
he expressly denied intentionally setting the fire and instead described starting the fire
accidentally. Id. at 441. In his motion to withdraw his plea, he "testified that the fire was
accidentally started." Id. at 442.
None of these factors are present here. In the plea colloquy, defendant neither denied
committing the crime twice, nor recounted a version of the facts inconsistent with his double
plea. In the hearing on his motion to withdraw, he did not testify at all, much less testify that
he committed only a single offense. Defense counsel claims—without record support—that
defendant "entered two guilty pleas for a single incident through some misapprehension of
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the facts and the elements," Br. Aplt. at 31. On the contrary, unlike Thurman and
Breckenridge, defendant himself has never, in the plea colloquy, the motion to withdraw
hearing, or any other hearing, claimed or manifested confusion about the nature and elements
of his crimes. Accordingly, there is no reason to doubt his written statement, reinforced by
the oral colloquy, that he committed two counts of threatening with a dangerous weapon.
C.

Any error was not obvious.

The trial court committed no error. But even assuming arguendo it erred, the error w as
not obvious, as demonstrated by the fact that defendant has chosen not to press a claim for
ineffective assistance against trial counsel, despite the fact that she did not raise this claim
in her motion to withdraw guilty plea. See point 2.B. above. In addition, no error that
requires 21 pages to explain, see Br. Aplt. at 19-40, can be called obvious.
D.

Any error was not prejudicial.

Similarly, assuming arguendo that the trial court erred, the error was not prejudicial, for
reasons stated in point 2.C. above.
Defendant's brief states, "If McArthur had been informed of the nature/elements of the
separate offenses, and their relation to the facts of this case, he would not have pleaded guilty
to two charges, particularly since his conduct supported only one offense." Br. Aplt. at 31
(citation omitted). However, defendant himself, despite having moved to withdraw his plea
in the district court, has neither asserted nor proven that, but for the alleged rule 11
omissions, he would not have pled guilty. He thus seeks reversal "for nothing more than
technical errors in the acceptance of [his] voluntary guilty plea[].,, Kay, 717 P.2d at 1302.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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Change of Plea
Electronically Recorded on
January 10, 2003
BEFORE:

Deputy Clerk

THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Third District Court Judge

For the Plaintiff:

Alicia H. Cook
SL Cnty Dist Dpty Atty
2001 S. State S3700
Salt Lake City, UT 84190
Telephone: (801)468-2617

For the Defendant:

Lisa J. Remal
LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)532-5444

Transcribed by:

Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT
1909 SOUTH WASHINGTON AVENUE
PROVO, UTAH 84606
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027

I

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on January 10, 2003)

3

THE COURT:

State of Utah vs. Raymond Dean McArthur,

4

case No. CR-02108.

Ms. Remal, you are appearing in his behalf

5

and Ms. Cook for the State.

6

MS. REMAL:

I am.

7

THE COURT:

Are you Raymond Dean McArthur?

8

MR. MCARTHUR:

9

THE COURT:

Yes, sir, I am.

Ms. Remal is your lawyer; is that correct?

10

MR. MCARTHUR:

11

THE COURT:

That's correct.

This matter is on the calendar incident

12

to a proposed resolution.

13

Ms. Remal?

14

MS. REMAL:

What is it your are proposing here,

Your Honor, what we're proposing is that

15

Mr. McArthur will be pleading guilty to amended Count I and

16

amended Count II.

17

with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel.

18

pursuant to 76-10-506.

19

that the State will move to dismiss the remaining counts

20

against him in this matter.

21

to recommend a reduction in bail for Mr. McArthur once those

22

pleas have been entered.

Both will be amended to reflect threatening
That's

Upon entry of those pleas, I anticipate

The State is also willing to agree

23

THE COURT:

The resulting charges are what?

24

MS. REMAL:

Threatening with or using dangerous weapon

25

in fight or quarrel.
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THE COURT:

Which i s —

2

MS. REMAL:

If I can approach, I have a copy of that.

3

THE COURT:

What is that, a misdemeanor or something?

4

MS. REMAL:

It's a class A misdemeanor, yes.

5

THE COURT:

Do you have an amended Information, Ms.

6

Cook?

7

MS. COOK:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

(Inaudible).
To your knowledge, then, Ms. Remal, after

pleas to the class A 's, do you believe that the rest of the
Informat ion is to be dismissed?

11

MS. REMAL:

Yes.

12

THE COURT:

And to your knowledge that constitutes the

13
14

entirety of the proposed resolution?
MS. REMAL:

Except that I understand Ms. Cook will

15

join me in recommending to the Court that Mr. McArthur's bail

16

be reduced to $10,000.

17

made its way to your file.

18

THE COURT:

I did file a formal motion.

It is here.

I hope it

Now insofar as the proposed

19

resolution is concerned, Ms. Remal, have you discussed it with

20

Mr. McArthur?

21

MS. REMAL:

I have.

22

THE COURT:

And you've gone over the statement of the

23

defendant with him?

24

MS. REMAL:

I have.

25

THE COURT:

Are you persuaded he understands the
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effect and meaning of what he's about to do here?

2

MS. REMAL:

Yes.

3

THE COURT:

Does that fairly state the proposed

4
5

resolution, Ms. Cook, and if it does, will you state why?
MS. COOK:

It does (inaudible) your Honor.

I would

6

like to inform the Court that Count IV of the Information was

7

not bound over (inaudible).

8

THE COURT:

The class B, one of the class B's?

9

(Ms. Cook stood over at end of table away from

10

microphone, which made it impossible to get every

11

word)

12

MS. COOK:

13

arrest is not (inaudible).

14

ago, and the evidence presented by my witnesses (inaudible)

15

terribly strong in regards to (inaudible) amended Information

16

(inaudible).

17
18
19
20

Interfering a peace officer making an

THE COURT:

Have you discussed this with the victim?

Are victims involved?
MS. COOK:

The victims have been informed and

(inaudible).

21

MS. REMAL:

22

Mr. McArthur's, your Honor.

23

The prelim on this case a few weeks

THE COURT:

The victims are relatives of

Well, yeah, I see a domestic violence type

24

of a case (inaudible).

The question, though, it occurs to me

25

that it was not until the preliminary hearing, you realized
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that that didn't have a third degree.

2

MS. COOK:

3

THE COURT:

Well, of course.

4

MS. COOK:

Okay (inaudible).

5

THE COURT:

6
7
8
9
10

MS. COOK:

THE COURT:

Well, was it the first time it occurred to

you, at the preliminary?

12

THE COURT:

Yes.
You hadn't discussed this matter with your

witnesses previously?

14

MS. COOK:

15

THE COURT:

No (inaudible).
All right.

MS. COOK:

18

THE COURT:

They're satisfied (inaudible).
Mr. McArthur, do you understand what's

being proposed here?

20

MR. MCARTHUR:

21

THE COURT:

22

I'm quite sure (inaudible).

Well, you've talked to your lawyer about

it, haven't you?

23

MR. MCARTHUR:

24

THE COURT:

25

You say that the victims are

relieved to have this matter resolved.

17

19

I think (inaudible) trial after hearing the

witness testify.

MS. COOK:

16

Exercising acute critical analysis

yourself, you came to the conclusion that you didn't have it?

11

13

Your Honor (inaudible).

lawyer, haven't you?

Yes.

You've gone over that statement with your
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MR. MCARTHUR:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MCARTHUR:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. MCARTHUR:

6

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Do you understand that statement?
Yes, sir.

Do you have any questions at all about it?
No, sir.

Have any threats or promises been made to

7

you or against you to get you to enter into these plea

8

agreements other than what has been stated in open court?

9

MR. MCARTHUR:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. MCARTHUR:

12

THE COURT:

No, sir.

You're doing this freely and voluntarily?
Yes, sir.

You understand, Mr. McArthur, by pleading

13

guilty you're waiving certain constitutional rights that you

14

otherwise have.

15

MR. MCARTHUR:

16

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Including the right to by tried by a jury

17

of eight people, the right to require the State to prove their

18

case against you beyond a reasonable doubt to the unanimous

19

satisfaction of a jury of eight people, the right to confront

20

and cross examine witnesses produced by the State against you,

21

the right to compel the attendance of witnesses in your own

22

behalf at no cost to you, the right to take the stand and

23

testify in your own behalf, if you choose, or remain silent

24

during the trial, if you choose, and the right to appeal in the

25

event a jury finds you guilty of the charges at a trial, as
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well as the right to be presumed innocent until you're found

2

guilty if you are, all of which rights, as well as the others

3

contained on that statement that we may not have discussed

4

you're waiving by the entry of a guilty plea.

5

understand that?

6

MR. MCARTHUR:

7

THE COURT:

Do you

Yes, sir, I do.

And knowing those waivers, do you want to

8

proceed with this plea arrangement that the lawyers now have

9

decided upon?

10

MR. MCARTHUR:

11

THE COURT:

12

And you're doing this freely and

voluntarily?

13

MR. MCARTHUR:

14

THE COURT:

15

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

Are you prepared to sign that statement at

this time?

16

MR. MCARTHUR:

17

THE COURT:

18

(Defendant signs statement)

19

MS. REMAL:

20
21

Yes, sir.

You may do so.

Your Honor, if I may approach, Mr.

McArthur has now signed the statement (inaudible) as well.
THE COURT:

Very well, thank you.

Indeed both Counsel

22

and defendant have signed the statement.

Mr. McArthur, you

23

understand by having signed this statement you are admitted is

24

true and correct the following facts and elements involved in

25

two separate counts of threatening with or using a dangerous
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weapon in a fight or a quarrel, specifically that on or about

2

the 26th of October of last year through the 27th of October of

3

last year, at the location of 309 North, 1000 West in Salt Lake

4

County, you, according to the offense, did not in self defense

5

draw or exhibit a dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening

6

manner or unlawfully used the same in a fight or quarrel.

7

Those facts and elements are true and correct, are they not,

8

sir?

9
10

MR. MCARTHUR:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

This same conduct, which is constituted as

11

a threat of a dangerous —

use of a dangerous weapon in a fight

12

occurred at the same location, 309 North, 1000 West during the

13

same timeframe, the 26th/27th October on two different

14

occasions.

15

MS. REMAL:

It was during one incident, your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

Well, there's two different charges.

17

MS. REMAL:

Right.

18

MR. MCARTHUR:

19

THE COURT:

Yes.

So someone has been able to find that

20

there were two separate incidences going on here, even though

21

it may have been part of the same larger fight, right?

22

prepared to plead to two separate charges—

23

MR. MCARTHUR:

24

THE COURT:

25

a dangerous weapon.

You're

Yes, there—

—involving the use of threatening use of
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MR. MCARTHUR:

2

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Those facts and elements as they relate to

3

the use of dangerous weapons, specifically a knife, did occur

4

during the time frame as indicated at the location stated; is

5

that right, sir?

6

MR. MCARTHUR:

7

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Do you understand that those facts and

8

elements constitute two separate class A misdemeanor crimes for

9

which you could be sentenced by this Court for a period of up

10

to one year in the Adult Detention Center and fined a sum of

11

$2500 plus a surcharge.

12

MR. MCARTHUR:

13

THE COURT:

That's clear to you; is it not?
Yes, sir.

And knowing the potential penalty of one

14

year and/or a $2500 fine on each of the two, do you want to

15

proceed with this arrangement these lawyers have worked out?

16

MR. MCARTHUR:

17

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

You understand furthermore that if I

18

determine to commit you to the jail, those terms in jail could

19

well be consecutive as opposed to concurrent?

20

MR. MCARTHUR:

21

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

I will therefore accept your statement if

22

it is executed freely and voluntarily, Mr. McArthur, which I

23

assume it is?

24

MR. MCARTHUR:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, sir (inaudible).

Very well.

Due to the charges as set
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forth in Count I of the Information has now been amended by

2

interlineation to threat —

3

weapon during a quarrel, a class A misdemeanor.

4

what is you plea?

5

MR. MCARTHUR:

6

THE COURT:

threatening use of a dangerous

Guilty.

Count II, threatening use of a dangerous

7

weapon during a quarrel, a class A misdemeanor.

8

what is you plea?

9
10

To Count I

MR. MCARTHUR:
THE COURT:

To Count II

Guilty.

I will accept your guilty pleas and

11

dismiss the balance of this information.

12

justice you have the right now to be sentenced in no less than

13

two nor more than 45 days from today's date.

14

your matter for sentencing.

15

COURT CLERK:

16

THE COURT:

In the interest of

I'll schedule

February 21st.
The 21st of February, which is Friday

17

morning at 8:30.

In addition, you have the right for good

18

cause shown in no more than 30 days from the date of sentencing

19

to move to set aside the guilty pleas entered here.

20

Now Counsel, there is a motion to reduce bail, and

21

you're prepared, I'm advised, Ms. Cook to concur with or at

22

least not object to that motion?

23

MS. COOK:

24

THE COURT:

25

That's correct.

the victims involved?

What kind of threat does this man pose to
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MS. COOK:

Well, it was my understanding that he

2

(inaudible) he would stay entirely away from them.

3

(inaudible).

4

MS. REMAL:

I'm

Your Honor, I can respond to that, I

5

think.

6

were reduced the Court certainly would order him to stay away

7

from the individuals involved in this case, which is his

8

mother, his sister and his daughter.

9

As I stated in the motion, we expect that if his bail

He has another relative, a niece, that provided her

10

name and address with whom he can reside.

11

employment available to him, but probably more important than

12

anything is his intention to immediately seek treatment for

13

alcohol abuse.

14

McArthur had been consuming alcohol, and we understand that

15

that has created a lot of problems for him in his life and

16

certainly contributed greatly to his inability to control his

17

behavior on this night.

18

that if his family were consulted, they would probably indicate

19

that use of alcohol makes a huge difference in his behavior.

20

He still has

At the time of this event, it's clear that Mr.

THE COURT:

I don't know for sure, but I expect

Well, since the State doesn't seem to be

21

particularly concerned about the reduction and is willing to

22

agree to it, I have no basis upon which to challenge the wisdom

23

of the stipulation of reduced bail.

24

request to reduce the bail.

25

I will therefore grant the

Now Mr. McArthur, as far as you and I are concerned,
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if you happen to make bail, you will absolutely have no contact

2

whatever with any of the victims involved in this matter.

3

that clear to you?

4

MR. MCARTHUR:

5

THE COURT:

Is

Yes, sir.

And you will absolutely not engage in the

6

use of any alcohol or illicit substances during this pre-

7

sentence period; do you understand?

8

MR. MCARTHUR:

9

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

You follow those terras and

10

keep in touch with your lawyer, but you be back here for

11

sentencing on the date of the 21st of February at 8:30 in the

12

event you're going to make bail.

13

referral slip here that has the address of Adult Probation and

14

Parole on it.

15

office of the AP&P, give them the information they need to do

16

the pre-sentence report.

We'll provide you with a

If you make bail you must go immediately to the

Is that clear?

17

MR. ARTHUR:

18

THE COURT:

All right.

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, if I may approach, I have

19
20

Yes, your Honor.
Thank you.

That will be the

order.

21

prepared a not very nice looking, but I think a document that

22

would reflect (inaudible) order (inaudible).

23

THE COURT:

That's fine (maudibLe).

24

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, Ms. Cook is suggesting that we

25

make sure that the trial date, which was set for the 21st and

-1322nd is stricken.
THE COURT:

I'm assuming—
Well/ of course.

(Hearing concluded)
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I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the
I State of Utah, do hereby certify:
8 !
That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed
under my direction from the electronic tape recording
9
made of these proceedings.
I
That this transcript is full, true, and correct
10 I and contains all of the evidence, all of the
I objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and all
11 ! matters to which the same relate which were audible
1
through said tape recording.
12
I further certify that I am not interested in the
outcome thereof.
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record, and therefore the name associated with the
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speaker.
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COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff,

Case No. Om \Z-\C? ^

vs.
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Defendant.
I, I^Hoo^.yj 0 ^ c-^itixA . hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
advised of and that I understand the following facts and riehts:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Degree

Crime & Statutory
Provision
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I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:
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I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest):
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Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand

-»,\.

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
Khaye not^have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waivcd-my-r4ght-to counsel.
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and vulaiiiariiy-fbrthcfottowtngreasons:

'vcT-
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Wtmvjb waived my ris^Htfcoun^el, I certifv that
statement and that
I understand the namre^rKtelements ofthe chars^s^afid crimes
I am ple^din^rguilt}
5r no contest). Jkilso understand m^rifnts in this case ^nd^
cases and the
consequence my guilty (or n^pmest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is L i S7\ J ii» W
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) pleafs).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial a) I would have therightto see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to. and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the
State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself.
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my
refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead
guilty (or no contest). I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty,"
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving

3

each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained aboveConsequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest), fknow that by-pleading guilty (or no
contest) to-a-erime that~carries a-mandatory penaky^^itt^e^tibjeeting myself to serving
^-mandatory penalty for that crime: I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
^\*A
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as pan of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.

4

"isr

Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
DefeiidiiiK s Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my ownfreewill and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of mv attornev.

. ,

I am ^ 2 years of age. I have attended school through the ^ S
grade. I can read
and understand the English language, i& do not understand English, an interpfeterkas been"•provided to me.- I was not under the influence of an> drugs, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent mefromunderstanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

<>

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced
andfinaljudgment has been entered, I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any
reason.
Dated this ^

day of

"Jft^v&A^,

j

2 CC\

DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for fw-j op^rvi ft ftvrVrthir"". the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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Mo

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
|U.^>,-S^A 0
iVyfln^t ^ . defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant
and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.
*
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Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) pleaf s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

_^Kday of

